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GAMBLING ON FAITH: 
A HOLISTIC EXAMINATION OF 
BLAISE PASCAL'S WAGER 
JAN VAN VLIET 
I. Introduction 
Over three centuries after the publication of the Wager the sense of shock and dismay that meets Blaise Pascal's unorthodox tool of apologetics 
is matched only by attempts to reinterpret and reconstruct it or by out of 
hand dismissal of Pascal's claim to be Christian.1 This essay attempts to 
take a close and holistic look at the Wager—its premises and claims, as well 
as some attempts at reinterpretation. Do the reinterpretations stretch the 
integrity of the model or are they successful endeavors to push out the 
boundaries? We offer a tentative suggestion for conceptual and statistical 
extension of the Wager on its own terms, remaining faithful to its original 
construct. 
Any metaphysically- and epistemologically-consistent system has this-
worldly implications in the structure of values and ethics it enjoins. To obtain 
full appreciation of Blaise Pascal's theological and ethical teaching, we 
comparatively examine Pascal's value structure by studying the similarities 
and differences that surface between the implied ethics of the Wager, a more-
fully developed explicit value structure derived from Pascal's own Pensees, 
and the ethical dimensions prescribed by a system of Christian-theistic 
ethics. Not only does this help us to place the Wager in a context more faithful 
to Pascal's entire system of thought, but, in doing so, this method of pro­
ceeding may go some distance in mitigating long-standing evangelical angst. 
The primary criticism of the Wager has been that it enjoins faith on 
purely rationalistic grounds. Therefore we examine Pascal's use of reason 
in this apologetic tool, we draw some comparisons with the use of reason by 
Jan van Vliet is a Ph.D. candidate and instructor in church history at Westminster Theological Seminary. 
1 Most volumes devoted to Pascal's Wager contain useful introductions, all with interesting 
accounts of his life and times. Blaise Pascal was born in Auvergne, France, in 1623, into an 
upper class family, was home-schooled by his father and demonstrated mathematical brilliance 
from a very early age. He moved in the rarefied intellectual circles of the day, was converted 
to the faith (as expressed by Jansenism) in 1646 and had a very powerful spiritual experience 
—a "second conversion"—in 1654. He engaged in religious controversy and emphasized the 
virtuous life, dying at age 39 (Blaise Pascal, Pensees, translated by W. F. Trotter and with an 
Introduction by T. S. Eliot [London & Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1931], vii-xix). 
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the Puritans of his century and we scrutinize the Wager—its entire philo­
sophical foundations—through the grid of the presuppositional apologetic 
pioneered by Cornelius Van Til. 
II. Pascal's Wager 
1. Pascal's Gaming Construct 
Blaise Pascal argues that regardless of evidential considerations for the 
existence of God, it is eminently reasonable to believe in God. Thus, not­
withstanding any ostensible lack of evidence to the contrary, humanity has 
a self-interest to believe in God based on the exercise of simple cost-benefit 
analysis which makes use of the fundamental laws of probability. Pascal sets 
up his gaming exercise in the following way. With respect to the existence 
of God, there are only two possibilities: God either exists or he does not 
exist. Let us call these the metaphysical options. Each one of these options 
can be met with one of two faith conditions, belief or unbelief. In turn, each 
one of these faith conditions brings upon Pascal's betting partner implica­
tions of both a finite and an infinite nature. Based on these implications and 
the (simple) laws of probability, the subject is well-advised to exercise that 
particular faith option by which self-interest is best served through the 
maximization of benefits—i.e., there is every motivation to decide in favor 
of belief. 
What would compel a subject to make the decision to believe? What are 
the underlying assumptions of this "system" called Pascal's Wager? In the 
first place let us consider the reality of God's existence. Pascal assumes that 
belief in God has rewards stretching into infinity—all of the biblical prom­
ises that comprise eternal and infinite felicity in the presence of God and his 
people in a redeemed heaven and earth. On the other hand, there are costs 
associated with belief in God. But these costs are temporal, material and 
not to be compared to the eternal "rewards" of belief. To believe in God, 
therefore, and it happens he exists, yields the believer infinite joy but some 
finite displeasure. Conversely, if the subject refuses to make a faith com­
mitment in the reality of God's existence, earthly, finite gain is experienced, 
but at the cost of eternal felicity. 
Now consider the alternative metaphysical option that God does not 
exist. Since there are no implications of an infinite nature for believing in 
God in this instance, then the implications are only finite: belief in God in 
the absence of his existence will have cost one some earthly pleasures. And 
the vote against belief with the hypothetical possibility that God does not 
exist yields the subject some finite gain and no infinite gain or loss. 
Pascal argues that the faith choice in the face of these two metaphysical 
options should be an easy one: to choose for the possibility of God's existence. 
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Now what harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful, honest, 
humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have 
those poisonous pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will 
tell you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you take on 
this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much nothingness in what you 
risk, that you will at last recognise that you have wagered for something certain 
and infinite, for which you have given nothing.2 
We have taken Pascal's Wager and presented it in tabular form below in 
Figure 1. The two metaphysical options (columns), each of which calls forth 
either one faith condition or the other (rows), yields a standard 2x2 matrix 
(two rows, two columns). Each of the metaphysical possibilities has assigned to 
it an objective probability corresponding to each faith condition. The resulting 
intersection between the rows~and the columns yields the indicated state of 
affairs for each of all four possible combinations. 





God Exists Probabilities 
0 <P(Oi )  <25, 
for all / 
2>(0/) = i 
i=l 
God Doesn 't 
Exist 
Probabilities 
0 < P (O i )  <25, 
for all / 














When objective probabilities are assigned to all of the possible states of 
affairs in the Wager; each of the four metaphysical-reality/faith-condition 
combinations carries with it a probability of twenty-five per cent. Thus, 
P(Oi) = .25, for each of the four possible states of affairs, where P indicates 
2 Pascal, Pensees, 233; I am using this translation of Pensees because of the handy topical 
organization performed by Trotter. The history of Pascal's pensees (thoughts/reflections)— 
writing, collection, publication—proves to be a very confusing one. Any introduction to his 
work will convince the reader of this fact. See for example Pascal's Pensees, translated by 
H. F. Stewart (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1950), ix-xi. In this present article, my 
convention in citing from Pensees is to quote pensee number. 
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probability, 0 indicates an option (or "outcome" in the language of proba­
bility theory), and i is the generic term for each of the four outcomes and 
is set from 1 to 4. 
Because tautologically the sum total of all probabilities must equal to 
unity (or 100 per cent), a further constraint is required. Thus, ILP(Oi) = 1; 
the sum total of all probabilities corresponding to each of the four possible 
states of affairs or outcomes represented by the four cells comprising the 
matrix in Figure 1 must equal unity. Thus, under the column "God Exists," 
for example, i = 1 for the situation obtaining in the case of belief (infinite 
gain, finite loss) and i = 2 represents the infinite loss and finite gain that 
unbelief earns, i = 3 corresponds to the finite loss associated with the ' 'God 
Doesn't Exist" and "Belief" combination while i = 4—finite gain—is expe­
rienced when one doesn't believe in God who doesn't exist. 
The cogency of Blaise Pascal's argument hinges on this: there is a one-
in-four chance of infinite loss. This possibility is perceived to be too great 
a gamble for the average rational individual to take. Pascal therefore asserts 
that "our proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in 
a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to 
gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is 
one."3 Simply put, a one-in-four chance of infinite gain is too great for the 
rational creature to pass up. One has a clear, self-interested reason for belief 
in God, regardless of whether or not God actually exists. This is the ar­
gument of the Wager in brief. 
In his representation of Pascal's Wager, Louis P. Pojman discusses the 
incommensurability of infinite losses and gains with finite losses and gains 
and dismisses the options pertaining to the situation in which God does not 
exist (cells 3 and 4 in Figure 1) leaving only one metaphysical option with 
which are associated infinite gains (with "Belief," cell 1) and infinite losses 
(with "Unbelief," cell 2). But although this model presupposes rationality 
in the decision-making process, it is not necessarily irrational to choose for 
finite gain only, because finite gain can be perceived through sensory expe­
rience, is immediately accessible and meets the exigencies of humanity's 
primal (if uncontrolled) instincts. Thus, we will retain these two options as 
real possible outcomes which leaves us with four legitimate choices. Each 
one of the options represented by these choices has an equal chance of being 
exercised and are all mutually exclusive. This is why we have assigned to 
each possible outcome a probability of .25, or twenty-five per cent. Thus, 
in the context of the model of Pascal's Wager in Figure 1, 0< P{Oi) < .25, 
where P(Oi) represents the probability of each possible outcome, and is 
constrained to something greater than zero but less than .25. We present it 
in generic form right from the outset for in so doing we leave open the 
possibility of adding more possible outcomes to each of the two metaphysical 
options. In other words, there can be a range of possibilities associated with 
3 Ibid. 
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the faith condition 4'Unbelief" and the metaphysical reality "God Exists." 
This could pertain, for example, to a group of individuals (in cell 2) who 
hold their atheism, in the face of God's existence, with different degrees of 
strength. The sum total probability for this group of individuals would still 
be constrained to twenty-five per cent. But now there exists the possibility 
of options within each of the four cells.4 
We will resist the temptation to challenge the presuppositions upon which 
Pascal's Wager is based, but we will offer some brief commentary. This has 
to do, specifically, with his characterization of the life of the believer as 
having finite cost. More precisely, Pascal is assuming, as we see from the 
quotation earlier, that believers forego "poisonous pleasures of glory and 
luxury" and have only faithfulness, honesty, humility, gratefulness, generosity, 
and so forth. But would this be the honest appraisal of the believer who 
takes a retrospective glance through the corridors of his or her own personal 
history? It may be that periods of persecution arise in which it is very costly 
to believe. Yes, there are periods of time when "glory and luxury" evade 
because of a commitment to biblical principles. But is it so common that we 
can generalize and construct an entire apologetic model upon this basic 
presupposition? There are many very happy rich Christians. There are also 
many unhappy, poor, persecuted atheists. 
No doubt Pascal would agree that the life of the believer is characterized 
by exercise of the four cardinal virtues, adherence to the Ten Commandments 
and the Golden Rule—in other words, a virtuous life, a life of commitment 
to God and neighbor. Associated with this, clearly, is avoidance of unvirtuous 
living, indulgence in, say, the "seven deadly sins." To be sure, understood 
in this way the life of the believer is one of restraint, of suspension of the 
thoughts, words and deeds associated with the unredeemed side of human 
nature which plagues all sinful humanity in an all too evident way. But it 
is not particularly clear that these are "finite" costs. And even if they can 
be defined this way, this still does not constitute a sufficiently strong criti­
cism of Pascal's presuppositions to warrant overhaul of his system on that 
score alone. 
2. Reformulating the Wager 
Attempts at major overhaul of Pascal's Wager are legion. Out of a concern 
related to the one we identified regarding Pascal's assumptions on this-
worldly benefits and costs, the French philosopher Jules Lachelier has at­
tempted to reconstruct the model from a somewhat different motive. This 
motive was driven by a desire to rescue Pascal from the commonplace 
4 Although this is conceptually difficult to grasp, and even harder to imagine in practice, 
the theoretical possibility exists. I am establishing this theoretical possibility here to set the 
context for an attempt at a broader application of this probability structure later in this essay. 
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criticism of justifying religious belief from pure self-interest. Nicholas Rescher 
explains the common accusation: ' 'Almost unanimously, commentators 
denounce the element of crassness that is present in Pascal's Wager argument 
and see it as blasphemous to support religious belief by considerations of 
prudence."5 
Pascal's apparent disregard for the benefits of the religious life were of 
concern to Lachelier. Not only that but, according to the latter, also the 
4 'negativities" of a life style devoted to hedonistic pursuit are not ade­
quately represented by contemporary Pascalian models. And so Lachelier 
attempts to deliver Pascal from what he considers to be the misrepresen­
tations of contemporary interpreters with the result that a ' 'straightforward 
dominance situation" results where superior benefits are afforded as long as 
one believes in God, whether or not God exists. We represent Lachelier's 
reconstruction below as Figure 2. 





God Exists God Doesn V 
Exist 
Relief: life commitment to 
self-improvement 
Unbelief: life commitment 
to selfishness 
1. 
Gain a life worthy of human 
dignity AND a blissful 
afterlife in heaven 
3. 
Gain a life worthy of human 
dignity 
2. 
Lose a life worthy of human 
dignity AND a blissful 
afterlife in heaven 
4. 
Lose a life worthy of human 
dignity 
It is apparent from this major revision that it is not at all true to Pascal. For 
one thing, the focus has shifted entirely to this-worldly concerns since the 
decision to believe or not to believe is based on the fruits gained from 
religious life in this world.6 The addition of the phrase "and a blissful 
afterlife in heaven" really adds nothing to the argument to motivate the 
decision to believe. Consider the incommensurability argument employed 
5 Nicholas Rescher, Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 117. 
6 This is a common criticism of Lachelier's renovation of Pascal's Wager as Rescher points 
out in ibid., 117-20. 
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by Pojman and discussed relative to Figure 1 above. It was maintained that 
no matter how enormous the finite gain represented by the respective states-
of-affairs depicted there, the mere possibility of infinite benefits reduced the 
"Pascalian decision" to a choice of one of only two options. And then the 
choice—between infinite gain and infinite loss—is an easy and a predict­
able one. 
But now Lachelier introduces an entirely different and un-Pascalian incom­
mensurability. The incommensurability arises between cells 1 and 3 on the 
one hand and cells 2 and 4 on the other in Figure 2 above. The decision to 
have faith can be made entirely on the basis of the benefits from this world. 
In other words, the incommensurability is no longer between decision­
making options that return infinite as opposed to finite benefits, but rather 
between decision-making options both of which return finite benefits. Ac­
cording to Lachelier, the decision for belief is then made, finally, because 
of the 4'blissful afterlife in heaven" that he appends to the "worthy and 
dignified life" accruing to believers. The decision to believe can be made 
without reference to eternal concerns, strictly on the basis of this-worldly 
considerations. 
It is hard to imagine anything further from the spirit of Pascal's Wager. 
Pascal, the theologian, was concerned to contrast the infinite and eternal 
against the finite and temporal. He was dedicated to the concept of the 
superiority of the infinite over any possible benefits arising in this world, in 
finitude. And he illustrated this through (rudimentary) cost-benefit analy­
sis. The decision, finally, for belief, was motivated by the notion that infinite 
gain was far better than any finite loss. And the whole system is grounded 
in the balance of probabilities. This latter concern was that of Pascal the 
mathematician. 
Finally, Lachelier's reconstruction shows a clear victory for a state-of-
affairs on the basis of finite gain. He has done away with the need for 
probability analysis altogether replacing it with, what Rescher calls "a 
straightforward dominance situation." "The positivity of 'a life worthy of 
human dignity' would preponderate over the matter of costs, and the need 
for Pascal's probabilistic, decision-theoretic turn would be averted."7 As a 
consequence, there is no need to assign probabilities to the states of affairs 
in Figure 2. 
The major problem with the whole idea of this-worldly benefits is that 
Pascal's critics, like Lachelier, almost unanimously interpret these to be 
non-material. But Pascal clearly states in the quote above that he refers to 
finite loss in terms of "glory and riches" foregone, material wealth lost. To 
be sure, he seeks to provide some measure of comfort to his poor belea­
guered gambling partner who has just been overcome by the sheer force of 
Pascal's power of reason, but who is still, somehow, unsure. Therefore Pas­
cal assures his gaming participant of the intangible benefits to be derived 
7 Ibid., 117-18. 
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from betting on God. But in the balance, the pain of material loss is far 
greater than the balm of intangible gain and is clearly the issue here. 
Pascal's demonstrable implicit assumption that, finally, ' 'glory and riches" 
afford greater worldly gain than do faithfulness, honesty, humility, and so 
forth, constitute the very heart of the argument. All cogency would evapo­
rate without this predication. 
What this means is that Pascal's detractors are guilty of considering him 
less of a theologian than he is. For knowing the sinfulness of human nature 
(his Pensees discuss this at length) Pascal is, rightly, prepared to concede the 
battle between living virtuously and continuing in sin to the latter. And 
such unvirtuous living issues in enhanced 4 'glory and riches." Pascal has an 
astutely biblical insight into human nature, much more so than all of his 
detractors. As long as attempts to reconstruct Pascal's Wager advance along 
the lines described above—focusing on the inherently beneficial but intan­
gible advantages of living the life of the believer rather than on the material 
(dis) benefits as Pascal himself defined them—efforts to revamp Pascal are 
not only certainly doomed to failure but also, by their disingenuousness, 
unfaithful to Pascal's own emphases and concern. 
We come back one more time to what we consider to be presumptive in 
Pascal's presuppositions—that he considered finite gain and finite loss exclu­
sively in terms of material things, and that he assumed, ipso facto, that faith 
engendered such finite cost. We mentioned that there are rich, happy Chris­
tians and poor, oppressed atheists. But in truth, although this may be an 
acute theoretical criticism and not one to dismiss out of hand, it is never­
theless not an astute theological one. For it is most assuredly the case that 
Scripture teaches original sin, that Jesus teaches pain and suffering in this 
world, that 4'those who are not for me are against me" and that "all will 
hate you because of me." 
Thus, while the theoretical possibility of our criticism of Pascal's assump­
tions is a real one, Pascal has the biblical witness and theological reality on 
his side. Efforts to reinterpret Pascal's Wager must be faithful to Pascal the 
theologian. The history of attempts to remodel the Wager and the results of 
such renovation demonstrate just how dismally this has been true. As well, 
to be true to Pascal, reconstructed Wagers must lend themselves to the same 
kind of probabilistic analyses. As we have seen this, too, has been compro­
mised. Thus, while we too have been tempted to make efforts at renovation 
for the theoretical reasons specified above, we have resisted this temptation 
and take the Wager as is. But we will seek presently to extend the boundaries 
of the Wager to give it broader applicability. 
3. Blaise PascaVs System of Ethics 
A study such as this, which seeks to probe particular dimensions of a 
given belief-system, would be incomplete without examining the implied 
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value-system. Any metaphysical commitment and epistemological system 
provides direction to this-worldly existence. Indeed, any system of belief 
can be judged to be truly consistent and holistic only if great attention is 
paid to the ethical system to which it subscribes. This holds even absent of 
afterlife considerations. One does not live, move and have being in a vacuum. 
A presuppositional system of apologetics, for example, places great weight 
on the ethical component of knowledge. By comparing Pascal's view of 
ethics at this point, then, to the presuppositional standard, our argument 
will clearly serve as a corrective to some of the misdirected ways in which 
Pascal has been understood throughout the centuries. It should also be 
noted that Blaise Pascal was himself very much committed to ethical purity. 
As we shall see presently, his writings are replete with references to morality 
and the ethical life. Of significance as well is the contemporaneous ethical 
concerns in the age of the Puritans—these concerns greatly influenced the 
theological and intellectual arena in which Pascal lived and worked, even 
if from a geographical distance. The provenance and rise of Protestant 
ethics, or moral theology, was an inextricable part of post-Reformation 
philosophical and theological development, most of it in reaction to the 
hegemony of the moral theology of the Church of Rome. We will now 
develop somewhat further this mutual concern between Blaise Pascal and 
the Puritans of his era. 
We mentioned that the necessity for a decidedly Protestant moral theology 
issued in the development of a Puritan casuistry in particular distinction 
from that of the Roman Catholic Church. The seminal work in this regard 
of the English Puritan expatriate in the Netherlands, William Ames (1576-
1633) built on that great originator of Puritan casuistry, Ames' teacher 
William Perkins (1548-1602), generally recognized as the father of English 
Puritanism. Referring to the Puritan custom of borrowing Roman Catholic 
teaching on case-divinity, Ames opined that 4 'the children, of Israel should 
not need to goe downe to the Philistims (that is, our Students to Popish 
Authors) to sharpen every man his share, his Mattocke, or his Axe, or his 
weeding Hooke, as it fell out in the Extreame necessity of Gods people."8 
The connection between Blaise Pascal's demonstrated concern for virtuous 
living and the similar burden of the Puritans is direct. Thomas E Merrill 
has observed that the Puritan casuists ignored their contemporary Jesuit 
casuists in favor of the medieval soul doctors.9 This helps explain the depen­
dence of theologians like William Perkins and especially William Ames 
(clearly against his better judgment) on the Dominican patterns of medieval 
Catholic casuistry best seen in the moral theology of Thomas. Merrill explains: 
8 In Conscience, "To the Reader," cited in Keith L. Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William 
Ames [Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972], 177). 
9 Thomas F. Merrill, ed., William Perkins, 1558-1602, English Puritanist (The Hague: Nieuw-
koop, B. De Graaf, 1966), xii. 
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The brand of casuistry practised by [the Puritans'] Jesuit contemporaries they 
considered legalistic and prone to encourage moral laxity. The forensic approach 
of the Jesuits, they felt, stunted the proper development of the conscience by 
dictating the minimal requirements for the good life rather than inspiring men 
to strive for the best that was within them. The Jesuit Priest hearing Confession, 
it was assumed, relied upon minutely detailed rules of conduct which were labo­
riously related to equally detailed specific cases of conscience. Ultimately, ques­
tions of conscience were arbitrated by means of rigid application of precedent and 
law rather than judgment based upon the exigencies of circumstance. This form 
of moral scholasticism was abhorred by the Anglican casuists, and they did their 
utmost to avoid it.10 
The Puritan attitude towards the practical and moral theology of the Jesuits 
can best be described as disdainful. 
Blaise Pascal's conversion in 1646 at the age of twenty-three was to 
Jansenism, an Augustinian movement named after the Dutch thinker Corne­
lius Jansen (1585-1638) and devoted to a renewal of piety and devotion, taking 
deep root in France where it was headquartered. He criticized the moral 
hypocrisy of the Jesuits who led the charge against Jansenism and he was 
subsequently accused of heresy by the Sorbonne. The moral theology of the 
Jesuits thus sustained assault on more than one front—both the Puritans and 
the French Jansenists declared war on this group. With more than a trace of 
irony, Pascal muses: 4'the casuists submit the decision to the corrupt reason, 
and the choice of decisions to the corrupt will, in order that all that is corrupt 
in the nature of man may contribute to his conduct."11 
Some of the more instructive and salutary qualities in Pascal's Pensees are 
in the thoughts directed to morality and the unique understanding of human 
nature demonstrated by these reflections. As such they comprise as much 
an apologetic tool as the Wager. Despite the fragmentary nature of Pascal's 
Pensees, W. E Trotter has done a masterful job in collecting thematic sections 
and organizing his translation of the Pensees by subject matter. Fully thirty-
nine pages of Pascal's Pensees are devoted to "morality and doctrine." Except 
for the section on "The Misery of Man without God" (thirty-eight pages) 
this is far and away the longest section in the book. That Pascal attaches 
such a high priority to these two themes is extremely significant; the remainder 
of the book's 195 pages are collected under twelve more headings, an average 
of sixteen pages per theme. "The Necessity of the Wager" runs nineteen 
pages. Clearly it is to the Pensees that we must go in our search for Pascal's 
system of ethics. 
"All men seek happiness" instructs Pascal. "This is without exception. 
. . . This is the motive of every action of every man." And that happiness 
resides in the discovery of that chief good, God, who alone is our "true good." 
10 Ibid., xii-xiii. 
11 Sinclair B. Ferguson, David F. Wright and J. I. Packer, eds., New Dictionary of Theology 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 63, 492; Pascal, Pensees, 906. 
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In order to make men happy, [true religion] must prove to him that there is a 
God; that we ought to love Him; that our true happiness is to be in him. Let us 
therefore examine all the religions of the world, and see if there be any other than 
the Christian which is sufficient for this purpose. 
Shall it be that of the philosophers, who put forward as the chief good, the good 
which is in ourselves? . . . Have those who have made us equal to the brutes, or 
the Mahommedans who have offered us earthly pleasures as the chief good even 
in eternity, produced the remedy for our lusts?. . . What religion will in fact teach 
us our good, our duties, the weakness which turns us from them, the cause of this 
weakness, the remedies which can cure it, and the means of obtaining these 
remedies? 
All other religions have not been able to do so. Let us see what the wisdom of God 
will do.12 
Having directed humanity to the Christian religion wherein alone can be 
found the "chief good" it follows then to ask of Pascal: How do we obtain 
that chief good having identified it? Pascal answers that in this search, 
"there is open war among men, in which each must take a part, and side 
either with dogmatism or scepticism. For he who thinks to remain neutral 
is above all a sceptic. This neutrality is the essence of the sect; he who is not 
against them is essentially for them."13 Only by grace, can humanity be 
redeemed to be "like unto God, and a partaker in his divinity." And this grace 
is by faith, for "that man without faith cannot know the true good, nor 
justice."14 
Pascal makes much of what he calls the two vices: lust (of the flesh and 
of the eyes) and pride. Most of his musings on morality per se are ordered 
around these two categories. But although Pascal's thoughts on the moral 
life appear to be more passively oriented to suppression of these vices, he does 
hold to an active moral life, for "Christians have consecrated the virtues."15 
That the key elements of a biblical ethic are undoubtedly present in 
Pascal is evident from this small collection of his meditations. That it falls 
far short of a full-bodied system of Christian-theistic ethical principles is 
equally obvious. Can Pascal's ethical system, as embryonic as it is, be incor­
porated into such a system? 
Cornelius Van Til maintains a three-dimensional view of Christian-
theistic ethics.16 "It is the triune God of Scripture who sets before man his 
12 Pascal, Pensees, 425, 430. 
13 Ibid., 434; or in Cornelius Van Til's words, "neutrality is negation." 
14 Ibid., 425. 
15 Ibid., 503. 
16 These paragraphs on Christian-theistic ethics summarize Cornelius Van Til's key teachings 
of Part 1 in Christian Theistic Ethics> In Defense of Biblical Christianity; vol. 3 (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, n.d.). 
44 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL 
moral goal, who in his revelation gives him his moral standard, and by the 
gift of faith enables him to work toward his proper goal by way of following 
the instruction of his revelation."17 Van Til has identified a goal, a standard 
and a source of enablement to reach that standard. The epistemological 
presupposition determinative of the Christian view of ethics is that the 
revelation of the self-contained God, the ontological Trinity, is the ultimate 
reference point in all ethical questions. In other words, good is good because 
God says it is. Humanity was created, originally, with a perfect moral 
consciousness (if derivative, having to live by revelation) but by falling into 
sin that moral consciousness became and now is evil. Augmenting this key 
presupposition is the metaphysical assumption—that of the complete self-
consciousness of God. 
The chief good of men and women individually and in society—the 
summum bonum—is the realized program of God for humanity—the kingdom 
of God. Humanity reaches self-realization and self-actualization in its role 
as God's vice-regent over the created order. The thrust of the ethical life, 
then, is to work towards this summum bonum (itself a gift of the free grace of 
God) in obedience to the commands enjoined in Scripture and in the sure 
hope of future fulfillment. In pursuing such a Christian course of ethics, the 
work of the evil one is destroyed at the same time, also a key ingredient in 
the kingdom of God. This means to live in imitation of Christ in pursuit of 
true righteousness as prescribed in the moral law and reinforced by Christ's 
teaching. These are the features of the ethical principles taught in Scrip­
ture, over against the systems subscribed to and pursued by all those outside 
the pale of Christianity with whom the believer is in absolute ethical anti­
thesis. In summary, the Christian theistic system of ethics is one in which 
the kingdom of God, recognized as a gracious gift, is pursued by virtue of 
the redeemed will in obedience to the standards required by God's moral 
law. And for this system faith is the motivating power. 
To facilitate a brief comparison of the presuppositional and Pascalian 
systems of ethics under consideration, the table below uses the parameters 
of the well-defined presuppositional construct developed upon principles 
given us by Cornelius Van Til. The table compares the presuppositional 
system of ethics, in terms of these parameters, with two versions of Pascal's 
value system as these have been inferred from his Wager and his Pensees 
respectively. This is not to suggest that there is a discernible internal con­
tradiction in Pascal's own teachings. Rather, while recognizing the dis­
tinctive purposes of his more general reflections in his pensees as compared 
to the thrust of the Wager, it must at the same time be acknowledged that 
some kind of identifiable ethical system underlies the invitation to gamble 
on God. 
17 Ibid., Preface. 
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Figure 3 A Comparison of the Presuppositional and Pascalian Systems of Ethics 
.. Parameters of 
. Ethics The Summum 
Bonum of Ethics 
The Standard of 
Ethics 
The Motivating 





The Kingdom of 
God 
The will of God 
(moral law - active 
pursuit) 
The renewed will 
operating by faith 
Pascal - Pensees - The Christian God* The cardinal virtues 
(emphasis on 
suppression of vice) 
Faith 
Pascal - Wager Infinite gain (God) The cardinal virtues Self-interest 
motivated by a 
balance of 
probabilities 
•In fairness to Pascal I must note that he mentions the kingdom of God in the context of virtue, 
but the precise meaning escapes me: "The true and only virtue, then, is to hate self (for we 
are hateful on account of lust), and to seek a truly lovable being to love. But as we cannot love 
what is outside ourselves, we must love a being who is in us, and is not ourselves; and that is 
true of each and all men. Now, only the Universal Being is such. The kingdom of God is within 
us; the universal good is within us, is ourselves—and not ourselves" (Pascal, Pensees, 485). 
Although it is possible to read strict orthodoxy into this pensee without being disingenuous, 
it raises more theological questions than it answers, it seems to me. I thus leave it out of the 
consideration of my comparative construction of ethical systems. This is a problem with many 
of the shorter, more uncertain and less coherent thoughts. One can imagine confronting this 
problem at every turn in organizing the Pensees in the fashion Trotter and others have done. 
Some clarification is in order on the Standard of Ethics (column 3 in Figure 3 
above) and on the Motivating Power of Ethics (column 4) as we have identified 
these in Pascal's Pensees and the Wager. 
In the first place, we have set the Standard of Ethics as the cardinal virtues, 
something not explicitly put as such in the Pensees. As mentioned above, 
Pascal remained a son of the Roman Catholic Church despite his Jansenism. 
Since the days of Thomas Aquinas, and stretching back before him to 
Socrates, the system of ethical principles used as the guide by which to conduct 
one's life was represented by the four cardinal virtues of prudence (or 
practical wisdom), courage, temperance and justice. Even Puritan William 
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Perkins, the father of Puritan casuistry, constructed his system of case-
divinity within a framework in which the cardinal virtues were used as 
organizing principles. That this would have been Pascal's frame of refer­
ence is therefore without doubt. 
It can be demonstrated, as well, that Pascal's subscription to the cardinal 
virtues, if not explicit, are certainly implied in all his teaching. In the Wager, 
perhaps less than in the Pensees but there nonetheless, the summum bonum is 
also God as the infinite good. This too was a key doctrine of the Church of 
the day. By extrapolation, then, from this key doctrine to that of the car­
dinal virtues we can establish that these virtues, this value structure, con­
stitutes Pascal's Standard of Ethics in column 2 of Figure 3 above. 
But that the establishment of the cardinal virtues as the Standard of Ethics 
found in Pascal's Wager has equally robust justification may require further 
clarification. In seeking to convince his gambling partner to bet on the 
faith, recall Pascal's closing remarks, quoted earlier, reminding the target 
of his apologetic endeavor that there are, after all, finite benefits to be derived 
as well as the already established infinite gain: 4'Now what harm will befall 
you in taking this side? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, 
a sincere friend, truthful." Are these not expressions of the cardinal virtues? 
Thirdly and finally: Does "faith" appear as the Motivating Power of Ethics 
in the Pensees? This again, we must derive by implication for, although the 
principle of "faith" is inferred in numerous reflections, it is never really 
made explicit as an organizing ethical principle in the way that is done in 
the presuppositional system against which Pascal's ethical teaching is com­
pared. In the latter, "faith" is crisply identified as underlying the renewed 
will by which the summum bonum is accomplished. Yet Pascal will say: "It 
is the heart which experiences God, and not reason. This, then, is faith: God 
felt by the heart, not by the reason. . . . Faith is a gift of God; do not believe 
that we said it was a gift of reasoning."18 From these musings and others 
it is safe to assume that the primary "reason of the heart," unknown to 
reason, is faith itself. It is through faith, finally, that admission to the king­
dom is granted. And this by grace. It is fair, then, to designate faith as the 
motivating power in the ethical system, such as it is, in Pascal's Pensees. 
To summarize, a review of Figure 3 will substantiate the ethical con­
sciousness of Pascal as being decidedly that of the Christian. It justifies, too, 
the assertion that to study Pascal's Wager in isolation from his Pensees is to 
do him grave injustice, for the man behind the Wager is not only a prag­
matic rationalist seeking to justify belief in God with the tools of decision 
theory. But he is also a Christian and the use of reason in this fashion Pascal 
considered a worthy enterprise, because of its lofty and well-defined goal. 
For ' 'those to whom God has imparted religion by intuition are very fortu­
nate, and justly convinced. But to those who do not have it, we can give it 
18 Pascal, Pensees, 278, 279. 
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only by reasoning, waiting for God to give them spiritual insight, without 
which faith is only human, and useless for salvation." 19 
To be sure, Pascal held reason in very high esteem as a tool for apolo­
getics. But Pascal's ethical system, considered holistically, is at the very least 
embryonic of that of the presuppositionalist to which it already bears close 
resemblance. 
4. The '�nalogy" of Seren Kierkegaard
Before we conclude our focus on the attempts at reconstruction/reinter­
pretation of the ffilger, it is necessary to consider one final attempt at inter­
pretation, this time by way of "analogy." Robert Merrihew Adams endeavors 
to show that the total subjectivity of S0ren Kierkegaard can be presented 
in a way that is analogous to Pascal's ffilger. "Kierkegaard's views about 
religious passion suggest a way in which his religious beliefs could be based 
on objective reasoning-not on ·reasoning which would show them to be 
objectively probable, but on reasoning which shows them to be objectively 
advantageous." 20 But just how can this be done? 
First, we must briefly review Kierkegaard's views on religious belief. 
"Christianity lies in decision." Thus, from the point of view of historical 
truth, Christianity can never be indubitably asserted. One cannot lay any 
claim to the truth of Christianity on the basis of objective, historical evi­
dence and certitude for the simple reason that these do not exist. ''In 
historical matters," claims Kierkegaard, "the greatest certainty is still only 
an approximation, and an approximation is too weak for one to build his 
eternal happiness upon, since its incommensurability with eternal happi­
ness prevents it from obtaining." 21 Even scriptures-divine revelation-get 
one ''no further than an approximation" because establishing the veracity 
of the historical reliability necessary to prove its authoritative nature re­
quires a gargantuan effort; the propensity for error is infinite and most sure, 
sort of like "digging the tunnel under the Thames." 22 He concludes his 
commentary on the objectivity of faith with what he considers to be the 
heart of the problem of such objectivity and his solution of total subjec­
tivity: 
Here is the heart of the matter, and I come back to learned theology. For whose 
sake is the proof sought? Faith does not need it. Yes, it must regard it as an 
enemy .... When faith falters and begins to lose its passion, when it begins to 
19 Ibid., 282.
20 Robert Merrihew Adams, "Kierkegaard's Arguments Against Objective Reasoning in
Rdigioo" in Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wids­
worth Publishing, 1994), 456. 
21 Sercn Kierkegaard, "Subjectivity is Truth" in Pojman, Anthology, 439.
22 Ibid., 440.
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cease to be faith, then proof becomes necessary in order to command respect from 
the side of unbelief. . . . 
So when the subject of faith is treated objectively, it becomes impossible for a 
person to relate himself to the decision of faith with passion, let alone with 
infinitely concerned passion. . . . 
As soon as one takes subjectivity away—and with it subjectivity's passion—and 
with passion the infinite concern—it becomes impossible to make a decision— 
either with regard to this probability or any other; for every decision, every 
genuine decision, is a subjective action. . . . Decisiveness inheres in subjectivity, 
essentially in passion and maximally in the personal passion that is infinitely 
concerned about one's eternal happiness.23 
We have quoted Kierkegaard at length to demonstrate his foci. For him the 
very nature of religious faith renders support of this faith by objective 
reason both undesirable and misdirected, for doing this betrays patent 
ignorance of the true nature of faith, faith as subjective decision. Yet there 
are significant parallel concerns with those of Pascal. Kierkegaard wants to 
ascertain truth and the decision for faith without demonstrative or evidential 
reason. Pascal also wanted to force the decision for faith without demonstrative 
reason. But far from being subjective, Pascal relied on the tool of pragmatic 
reason that underlies decision theory. This is Pascal's self-acknowledged 
modus operandi—any number of quotations from his Pensees would under­
score that priority not the least of which is that well-known and much-
quoted 4'The heart has its reasons which reason does not know."24 Further, 
Kierkegaard has in view eternal happiness; this too is very central, the 
determining argument, as it were, in Pascal's Wager. To be sure, there are 
significant perspectival differences of a theological nature, and no doubt 
Kierkegaard would flinch at Pascal's ostensibly rationalistic "crassness," 
but is there enough similitude here to allow Adams to make the claim he 
advances as quoted above: that the objective advantage of Kierkegaard's 
religious beliefs could be demonstrated by objective reasoning? 
Adams' approach is to begin with the state of affairs desired 4 'most of all" 
by a person "whom Kierkegaard would regard as a genuine Christian 
believer."25 This state of affairs (S) or "outcome" as we have designated it 
earlier, consists of the truth of Christianity and this individual's relation to 
Christianity as a "genuine believer" and stirs up such desire within this 
individual that, on the smallest possible chance of success, all would be 
sacrificed to obtain it. 
23 Ibid., 441. 
24 Pascal, Pensees, 277. Trotter, appropriately I think, places this pensee in his section on "Of 
the Means of Belief." It is important to note that with this pensee Pascal does not disparage 
reason. Jan Miel considers this heart/head dichotomy a false one and the most misinterpreted 
area of Pascal's thought: "The contradictions in interpretation often seem to correspond to 
contradictions in Pascal's own use of the term [heart]" (Jan Miel, Pascal and Theology [Balti­
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969], 157). 
25 Adams, "Kierkegaard's Arguments," 456. 
PASCAL'S WAGER 49 
This results in the two metaphysical options of Pascal's Wager as pre­
sented in Figure 1 above: Christianity is true or it is not true (and Adams 
claims that Kierkegaard would not object to 4'so stark a disjunction").26 
Thus, one pursues S in the hope (based on, quite possibly, an infinitesimally 
small probability) that Christianity is true. Why? "Just in case one becomes 
a genuine Christian believer."27 So S is pursued in the recognition that 
chances for a genuine Christian relationship is based upon mere possibility: 
"one would increase one's chances of becoming a genuine Christian be­
liever by becoming one now (if one can), even if the truth of Christian 
beliefs is now objectively uncertain or improbable."28 
Immediately some problems arise with Adams' proposal. First, why is "a 
person whom Kierkegaard would regard as a genuine Christian believer" 
even remotely interested in pursuing S in the "probabilistic" manner Adams 
suggests? He or she is already there, presumably, and has no need of a 
practical, "prudential reason for believing." Having acknowledged this, 
however, there is something right about what Adams is saying. Perhaps he 
is underscoring the key problem with Kierkegaard's system: it is nothing 
more than a singularly existential approach to faith and, finally, demon­
strates the object of faith—faith itself. For Kierkegaard, true religious faith 
is to have faith in faith. In the absence of any further refinement from 
Adams on Kierkegaard's understanding of what constitutes a "genuine 
Christian believer" we will proceed on the assumption that a Kierkegaar-
dian believer, because his or her belief is based on the proverbial existential 
leap, is in need of and will pursue at all costs S, and will derive great comfort 
in his or her search for S from what Adams calls "practical, prudential 
reasons for believing." To conclude, Adams asserts that "Christian belief is 
therefore objectively advantageous for anyone who wants S as much as a 
Kierkegaardian genuine Christian must want it."29 
A second problem with Adams' proposal, and a fatal one, is that he changes 
significantly the value structure under consideration. With the introduction 
of this change, the analogy Adams claims his model to be is only a very 
remote one at best. His construction does not lend itself to the sort of system 
established by the Pascalian Wager introduced above. Even Jules Lachelier, 
for all his faithlessness to Pascal, is closer to the Pascalian mark. For although 
Adams sets forth two metaphysical options—the truth or non-truth of Chris­
tianity—and (only implicitly) two possible faith conditions which give rise 
to either S or not-S, the value structures are different. The optimal state of 
26 This is a good place to point out that Pascal's Wager, in purest form, says nothing about 
Christianity, as such. It addresses only the question of whether God exists. But in deference 
to Pascal's personal Christian commitment and his ruminations in Pensees, I will assume 
synonymity of the metaphysical possibility posed by Pascal (God exists/doesn't exist) and that 
of Kierkegaard-interpreted-by-Adams (Christianity is true/is not true). 
27 Adams, "Kierkegaard's Arguments," 457. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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affairs is dual in nature, comprised of desire for the truth of Christianity and 
personal relationship to Christianity as a genuine believer. But this state of 
affairs comprised of 4'desire" and "personal relationship" is not that of 
Pascal. For Pascal it is much more basic: infinite gain, infinite loss, finite 
gain and finite loss, period. The reasons are purely and entirely reasons of 
self-interest alone. There is no discussion on relationship and on desire for 
truth. The very nature of the Wager is to make a probabilistic decision based 
on truth s absence, a purely logical ratiocination. The reconstruction of 
Adams as he tries to incorporate Kierkegaard and as he drastically alters 
the terms of the argument can be considered only faintly analogous to the 
original. 
Finally, the only way that these states of affairs, these ultimate outcomes, 
Oi in the context of Figure 1 above, can be analogous to those in Pascal's 
Wager is if, by Christianity, Kierkegaard (and Adams interpreting him) 
understands what Pascal understands it to be. It does not appear that this 
is the case, however. From his Pensees it is manifest that the Christianity of 
Pascal is that of the orthodox faith. But it is unclear just what constitutes 
the Christianity of Soren Kierkegaard. 
5. Pushing Out the Boundaries: A Preliminary Step 
Having established that the problems implicit in Adams' reconstruction 
of Kierkegaard render it only faintly analogous to Pascal's Wager, we now 
ask whether the issues introduced by Kierkegaard-Adams can be incorpo­
rated into the model of the Wager and how this might be done. This will be 
our final task before we go on to our examination of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the Wager and a Christian-theistic examination of these. 
The representation of the Wager in Figure 1, can be used to demonstrate 
the wager's subsumption of Adams' "analogy" by considering each cell 
{Oi, for i = 1 to 4) as representing an infinite number of possible states of 
affairs, the total probability of which, for each cell, sums to .25. There is 
room, therefore, for degrees of difference, or gradations, within each cell. 
The Wager s overall structure remains unchanged—four outcomes, to each 
of which is attached a probability of twenty-five per cent. But there is room 
for variation in the detail. What this means is that there is an infinite 
number of possibilities of states of affairs within each of the four cells in the 
2x2 matrix of Pascal's Wager such that for each cell the probabilities 
associa ted  wi th  a l l  the  poss ib le  s ta tes  of  af fa i rs  sum to  .25.  Thus ,  ZP(Oj)  
= .25, where j = any possible state of affairs of the character Oi. 
Where to classify Adams' (or any) proposal requires subjective judgment. 
Because Adams presupposes the truth of Christianity with a greater than 
zero probability, we place his model in cell 1, in the "God Exists"/"Faith" 
quadrant of the matrix. Within this cell, and in this particular state of 
affairs (remember, one of an infinite number), one's degree of faith depends 
on the ardency of ones desire for that state of affairs, S, which desire is that 
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4'Christianity be true and that he himself be related to it as a genuine 
believer." How ardent is one in this desire? That depends on the probability 
one attaches to the possibility of the existence of God, starting from some­
thing greater than zero but constrained by the twenty-five per cent total 
probability allowed for the quadrant. The probability structure within the 
cell of the matrix (and each of the other cells 2 through 4) determines, shall 
we say, the "scale of ardency" of desire for S. 
This particular instance is representative of the underlying probability 
structure of the "almost Christian," located in the "God Exists"/"I Believe" 
quadrant, cell 1 of the matrix. And the sum of the probabilities of all j in 
this northwest quadrant is constrained to add to twenty-five per cent. 
To summarize, the novel feature of the system here proposed is that it is 
amenable to an analysis of Pascal's Wager within a more detailed system 
that allows for varying strengths of probabilities within each quadrant. Of 
course each quadrant and its content are determined by the proposition 
that God exists or that he doesn't exist. Each of these varying probabilities 
in each quadrant or cell has associated with it a state of affairs which is 
pursued with a given degree of ardency. And this ardency is, in turn, 
determined by the strength an individual assigns to the probability. The 
sum of the probabilities for all j in each quadrant is constrained by twenty-
five per cent. Such a system gives rise to a problem of constrained optimization 
to which can be applied standard statistical techniques for the determination 
of statistical tests of significance (i.e., statistical validity) for hypothesis testing. 
On the basis of these exploratory thrusts into the uncharted territory of 
Pascal's Wager; can Adams' reconstruction of Kierkegaard, an "analogy" 
to Pascal's Wager; be incorporated into a more comprehensive understanding 
of the Wager itself? Can the objectivity of Pascal be reconciled with the 
extreme subjectivity of Kierkegaard's existentialism? Because we have only 
tentatively proposed a solution that requires further conceptual and more 
rigorous statistical examination, we can answer, at this point, with no more 
than a very careful and cautiously optimistic "yes," but only in an indirect 
and subservient fashion—both conceptually and statistically—and only when 
subsumed within Pascal's broader, standard framework. 
III. A Presuppositional Appraisal of the Wager 
1. The Legitimacy of Reason in the Wager 
It was not so long ago that a Pascalian scholar apologized for offering 
another book on Blaise Pascal and his thought because of the "intolerable 
specialization of much recent writing on the subject. Entire works have 
been devoted to Pascal's family relationships, illnesses, scientific contribu­
tions, religious experiences and beliefs, political and social views, or to his 
predecessors and followers, his models and methods, his prejudices and 
52 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL 
failures."30 And so on. But, according to this author, ''books that try to 
understand the meaning and bearing of Pascal's whole thought are unfor­
tunately few."31 What this interpreter then decides to do is precisely that. 
And the clue to Pascal's thought and around which this scholar commences 
such a holistic treatise is that of "man in relation to the infinite." "To 
[Pascal], infinity and humanity are mysteriously linked and complemen­
tary to one another."32 It will not be lost on the reader that this is the theme 
with which Pascal chooses to introduce his Wager, one in which the argu­
ment of whether or not God exists and whether or not to believe are won 
by recourse to ultimate issues of an infinite nature motivated by the balance 
of probabilities. 
It is not entirely surprising, then, that the totality of theological and 
philosophical camps of all stripes and persuasions represents fruitful deposit 
from which a rich ore of opinion on the perceived problems with Pascal's 
Wager can be quarried. The motherlode, of course, in all of this mining is 
clearly found in the reaction to the perceived crass pragmatism of Pascal's 
justification for religious belief. This theme is commonplace and represents 
the one vein joining together all opinions on the Wager's intent and method. 
No matter how detractors choose to present or oppugn Pascal's thought, his 
emphasis on the use of reason to bring his partner in the Wager to conversion 
has brought about charges of gross inconsistency. This is because Pascal sets 
out with the claim that reason cannot determine our choice and he ends 
convincing his partner that it is most reasonable to wager on God's existence. 
To add to the confusion, the Pensees are replete with Pascal's deliberations 
on reason, on the heart, on the interrelation between the two and on the 
functioning of the two in matters of faith and religion. Speaking strongly in 
favor of faith, and disparagingly of reason in the faith act he says: 
It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God 
felt by the heart, not by the reason. . . . 
Faith is a gift of God; do not believe that we said it was a gift of reasoning. Other 
religions do not say this of their faith. They only gave reasoning in order to arrive 
at it, and yet it does not bring them to it.33 
Even more to the point, Pascal speaks with some cynicism of the contem­
porary state of religion (primarily of the Church of Rome to which faith he 
had converted) leaving no doubt as to his own position on the matter: 
There are two ways of proving the truths of our religion; one by the power of 
reason, the other by the authority of him who speaks. 
We do not make use of the latter, but of the former. We do not say, 4 This must 
be believed, for Scripture, which says it, is divine." But we say that it must be 
Roger Hazelton, Blaise Pascal: The Genius of Mis Thought (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
31 Ibid. 
32 Hazelton, Pascal, 13. 
33 Pascal, Pensees, 278, 279. 
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believed for such and such a reason, which are feeble arguments, as reason may 
be bent to everything.34 
With such a view of reason, especially its utility in matters of faith, how can 
Pascal advance his Wager with such singular and explicit force of reason? 
This question has stumped commentators and scholars alike and this ap­
parent inconsistency has blunted the force of the Pascalian argument. How 
can we square such rational pragmatism with his views on faith and reason 
just quoted? 
Rescher has probed that question and come up with an answer which 
successfully deflects the charges of internal inconsistency. In a chapter en­
titled "The Epistemology of Pragmatic Beliefs," he draws the "critical" 
distinction between evidential reason and practical reason: 
Two very distinct species of "reason" are at issue in Pascal—the evidential that 
seeks to establish facts (and is in his view entirely inadequate to the demands of 
apologetics) and the practical that seeks to legitimate actions (and can indeed 
justify us in "betting on God" via the practical step of accepting that he exists). 
The heart too has its reasons. Only by blithely ignoring this crucial distinction 
between evidentially fact-establishing and pragmatically action-validating rea­
son can one press the charge of inconsistency against Pascal.35 
Rescher continues his incisive probe into the two "compartments" of episte­
mology introduced in this quotation: the evidential considerations that 
ground our beliefs and the rational considerations by which decisions are 
made in the absence of the evidence requisite for belief-grounding. Rescher 
emphasizes that it is the exigency of decision-making which forces use of the 
practical over against the theoretical reason: "the salient difference between 
'purely theoretical' and practical contexts is that in the former one can 
always suspend judgment without penalty, while in the latter we must 
make up our minds." In the normal course of human existence, in fact, 
"cognitive/epistemic deliberations" occur, more often then not, in practical 
settings "and are thus subject to the ground-rules of practical rationality 
rather than those of theoretical rationality alone."36 Thus, gambling for the 
faith, betting on God's existence, is the rational thing to do on pragmatic 
grounds, in the absence of evidential reasons. 
This view on the use of reason and epistemological categories is not at all 
a new development. Firstly, the use of a wager argument was quite common 
in the seventeenth century to "prove" hypotheses like the existence of God 
or the immortality of the soul. In fact, Roger Hazelton observes that in 
Pascal's time nine versions of the wager argument were in currency. And 
34 Pascal, Pensees, 560. That Pascal is writing in a cynical fashion is apparent from this single 
reading, this particular pensee. But this is not always immediately apparent from each in­
dividual pensee, read independently. One must read at length in Pensees to obtain Pascal's 
spirit and fully appreciate his display of irony. 
35 Rescher, Pascal's Wager; 44. 
36 Ibid., 45-46. 
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although Pascal has adapted the wager model to his own purposes, 4 'con­
scious borrowing by Pascal becomes clear."37 
Secondly, those familiar with the Puritans—their tradition, their thought, 
and their precision—will immediately recognize great similarity with 
Reseller's presentation of Pascal. This use of the theoretical and practical 
modes of rational judgment is most obvious in the casuistry of the seven­
teenth century. We mentioned above that while Puritan casuistry had its 
provenance in the ground-breaking work of Puritan William Perkins, it was 
his student William Ames who, in his Cases of Conscience, constructed the 
intellectual and theoretical underpinnings for the system of Puritan casu­
istry that reached well into the eighteenth century.38 
It will be useful to review Ames' teaching on the working of the practical 
and theoretical judgment to validate Rescher's explanation of the interplay 
of the various epistemic compartments in the exercise of judgment. 
What are the dynamics of conscience in action? Following the casuistry 
of William Perkins before him, Ames explains that conscience results from 
exercising the intellect, not the will, because it utilizes judgment which 
belongs to the faculty of reason. But this intellectual exercise is more than 
just bare assent to facts or 4 'apprehension of the truth;" rather, this judg­
ment presupposes an already "firm and settled" truth. Consequently, it is 
not a "contemplative judgement, whereby truth is simply discerned from false­
hood: but a practical judgement, by which, that which a man knows is particu­
larly applied to that which is either good or evil to him, to the end that it 
may be a rule within him to direct his will."39 
William Ames designates conscience, "with the best Schoolmen," as act 
(and not habit or faculty), for it is an act of practical judgment, "proceeding 
from the Understanding by the power or means of a habit." Further, these 
acts of judgment operate by discourse through syllogism (as opposed to the 
dichotomy's other possibility, simple apprehension which would be based 
on evidential considerations).40 
37 Roger Hazelton, "Pascal's Wager Argument" in Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis, 
eds., The Heritage of Christian Thought: Essays in Honor of Robert Lowry Calhoun (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1965), 108-26, 124. 
38 William Ames, Divinity, I & II Peter, Conscience, front pages missing, n.p., n.d., [1642b] 
4.11. Ames' introductory words to the reader are missing from this composite volume. I cite 
from this volume in book-chapter-section sequence. Within the context of this essay, it is rather 
interesting that one of the University of Franeker's more famous students during William 
Ames' tenure there was French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes (1596-1650). 
Ironically, "while Ames and his fellow theologians were teaching that man walks by faith, 
Descartes was laying the foundations of modern rationalism" (Sprunger, Ames, 80). 
39 Ames, Conscience, 1.1.2-1.1.3. 
40 Ibid., 1.1.6, 1.1.8. Ames' analytical style is Ramist, following the method of French 
Huguenot philosopher, Peter Ramus (1515-1572). Ramus questioned the authority of Aristotle 
and greatly influenced the methods and teaching of logic through the seventeenth century. 
Ramus believed facts could best be understood and explained in a series of successive dichot­
omies. Although William Perkins freely adopted the Ramist method, William Ames' work is 
the quintessential example of the degree to which early English Puritanism was prepared to 
appropriate Ramism wholesale. 
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Leading the way a generation earlier, Perkins had already suggested that 
"conscience gives judgement in or by a kind of reasoning or disputing, 
called a practical syllogism."41 This syllogistic adjudication is conducted in 
the court of one's conscience and the three-statement construct is the field 
of operation of the mind and the memory. It comprises the proposition, the 
assumption and the conclusion and by deduction makes a judgment.42 And 
for William Ames, Thomas Aquinas was indeed the "best Schoolman."43 
It was by means of the syllogism that the Puritans wanted to force decision 
with respect to the minor (middle) premise, one's personal standing. 
To be sure, we must adjust for differences in context and emphases in 
comparing Pascal with the Puritans. But it is clear that for Pascal's Puritan 
contemporaries as well, epistemic deliberations consisted of practical (if not 
necessarily pragmatic) rationality, not just theoretic (contemplative) considera­
tions. Understood in this fashion, Pascal's use of reason (practical) to demon­
strate the inability of reason (evidential) is hardly internally inconsistent 
and in the context of his Wager has great merit. 
But what are some of the shortcomings of Pascal's Wager? And how can 
a presuppositional Christian-theist address these? 
2. Reason's Failure in the Gamble for Faith 
It should not be surprising that the most obvious apologetic problem with 
Pascal's Wager is its singular reliance on reason and probability for the 
41 William Perkins, The Workes of that Famous and Worthy Minister of Christ in the University of 
Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins, 3 vols. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1612), 1.535. 
42 Ames presents the syllogistic workings of the conscience of a sinner in the following 
fashion to illustrate: "He that lives in sin shall die; I live in sin; I shall die." For Ames, the 
proposition is the law, the objective biblical teaching with respect to a particular subject, e.g., 
"He that lives in sin shall die." The assumption, Ames calls an "index," or a "witness," or a 
"book," i.e., an observation on the state of things relative to the proposition, e.g., "I live in 
sin." And finally, the conclusion is designated the judge, e.g., "I shall die." Ames concludes, 
Conscience, 1.1.8-1.1.10, 1.1.11, 
In that Syllogism alone is contained the whole nature of Conscience. The Proposition treats of the 
Law; the Assumption of the fact or state, and the Conclusion of the relation arising from the fact or 
state, in regard of that Law; The conclusion either pronounces one guilty, or gives spiritual peace and 
security." 
43 It is important to recognize the Aristotelian system behind Ames' method of syllogism 
applied to the practical reason. In his discussion on the Nature of Law in Question 90 of Summa 
Theologiae, Thomas asserts: "As with outward acts a distinction can be drawn between the 
doing and the deed, ... so also with the activities of reason the actual thinking, namely 
understanding and reasoning, and what is thought out, namely first a definition, next a 
proposition, and finally a syllogism or argument, can be considered apart. And because the 
practical reason makes use of a sort of syllogism in settling on a course of action ... in 
accordance with the teaching of Aristotle [Ethics VII, 3. 1147a24], a proposition can be 
discerned which is to practice what a premise is to the conclusions the theoretic reason draws" 
(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Law and Political Theory, ed., Thomas Gilby O.P. vol. 28. 
Blackfriars Latin text with Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries, 60 vols. [New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963-76], 5-7). The Aristotelian provenance of Pascal's prac­
tical rationalism is apparent here as well. 
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generation of its solution-—the decision for faith. The God of the Wager is 
but one whose existence is probable, no more. Uprooted from any firm 
grounding in the self-revelation of God, Pascal's Wager becomes an exercise 
in the application of probability analysis. We have demonstrated above just 
a little distance of the length to which Pascal's Wager can be extended, 
almost reducing it to an exercise in statistical techniques and probability 
theory.44 We have also shown the legitimacy of Pascal's use of reason in the 
Wager on reason's own ground, for this is the point at which most detractors 
score a victory. But now we must vote decisively against this system as an 
apologetic enterprise because of its misdirected orientation. If improperly 
rooted, its fruit, should it bear any, will be seriously flawed at best. Such 
must be our judgment of the Wager anchored as it is in its non-Christian 
epistemology. For the only possible apologetic endeavor must begin with 
the self-revelation of the truly-existing and self-contained God of divine 
revelation, Scripture. Therein lies its success. 
It has been shown that the intellectual and epistemological provenance 
of Pascal's Wager and his use of reason is Thomistic but predates even the 
4'angelic doctor" and has its real roots in Aristotle. Herein lies the funda­
mental problem of the Wager and Pascal's system. For in reference to the 
investigative techniques employed, the epistemology is decidedly non-
Christian. Despite Pascal's conversion he remained a son of the Church of 
Rome, a church whose epistemology, avers Cornelius Van Til, was informed 
by "the remnants of paganism in Augustine's thought" which theologians 
of the Middle Ages raised to "great prominence in the system of the church." 
4 'Thomas Aquinas, the great master of Scholasticism, tried to defend the 
truth of traditional and received church doctrine by employing the Aristo­
telian methods of reasoning."45 
To be sure, Pascal's Pensees, reflect his concern for sound Christian-theistic 
faith: 
There are three sources of belief: reason, custom, inspiration. The Christian 
religion, which alone has reason, does not acknowledge as her true children those 
who believe without inspiration. It is not that she excludes reason and custom. On 
the contrary, the mind must be opened to proofs, must be confirmed by custom, 
and offer itself in humbleness to inspirations, which alone can produce a true and 
saving effect.46 
One wonders how far Pascal himself, with his mathematical genius, would be prepared 
to go in this regard, with early twenty-first-century computer technology at his disposal. In 
fact, Pascal's innovative seventeenth-century counting machine is considered to be the very 
forerunner of the computer technology we use today. 
Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, In Defense of Biblical Christianity 
Series, vol. 2 (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2nd ed. n.d.), 56-57. 
46 Pascal, Pensees, 245. In his translation, H. E Stewart translates "inspiration" as "reve­
lation." His last sentence reads: "but the mind must be habitually open to proof, and must 
humble itself to bow to revelation, the only true and wholesome influence" (Stewart, Pascal's 
Pensees, 243). I cannot judge with certainty whether Pascal means divine revelation by his use 
of the word "inspiration" which Stewart translates as "revelation." But I find it puzzling that 
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It is hard to imagine any true Puritan in the tradition of William Perkins 
and William Ames finding himself in disagreement with such an assertion. 
As demonstrated above, it was just such a context that provided the frame­
work for the Puritans' understanding of the dynamics of conscience. But is 
this really the spirit of Pascal's own Wager? Although armed with a fuller 
understanding of Pascal's thought derived from his Pensees it could be argued 
that he advanced the Scholastic epistemology in a direction more akin to 
Christian-theistic thinking (forgetting for a moment his emphasis on and 
initiation of probability theory), it is nonetheless the case that his episte-
mological categories are decidedly Aristotelian. Blaise Pascal was only half-
Puritan.47 
Despite the obvious differences in approach to the apprehension of knowl­
edge, the influence of Rene Descartes over Pascal's Wager is fundamental. 
To be sure, Descartes held unswervingly to the necessity of evidential consid­
erations and these apprehended through the epistemic processes of human 
reason. And Pascal eschewed any such necessity as is evident from the Wager 
itself. Yet even if Pascal's method was signally different from the great 
skeptic, his motivation was the same. And so Rescher can rightly hold that 
"Pascal retained Descartes' skeptically-inspired preoccupation with the 
processes and products of the human intellect."48 The Wager is testimony 
to this.49 For Descartes, a revision of Anselm's ontological argument would 
do as proof of God's existence. 
It should not surprise us that in the absence of demonstrative (evidential) 
knowledge, probabilism must necessarily fill the void. In our search for the 
perfect means to establish the existence of God, we can do away with Descartes 
and his extreme rationalistic metaphysics and replace him with Pascalian 
pragmatic rationalism, but still doubt and skepticism motivate the Wager 
and the probabilistic God posed at the beginning of the wager is precisely 
that which results after the bets are laid. Or we could go to Scripture. 
This is what Cornelius Van Til chooses to do in his presuppositional 
apologetic. True knowledge of God is simply not constructed upon hypotheses. 
In this connection, Van Til says the following about a priorism: 
he does say "aux inspirations" in the key last sentence of the quotation, a clearly plural form 
of the word meaning "inspirations" or "revelations." Is this a reference to scriptural "reve­
lations" or extrabiblical "revelations?" 
47 While Cornelius Van Til despairs of the non-Christian epistemology underpinning Roman 
Catholicism, he hastens to add that the epistemology itself is useful, if used in God's service: 
"It should be carefully noted that our criticism of this procedure does not imply that we hold 
it wrong for the Christian church to make formal use of the categories of thought discovered 
by Aristotle or any other thinker" (Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 57). Does Pascal's Wager 
reflect such legitimate use of Aristotelian categories? 
48 Rescher, Pascal's Wager,; 4. 
49 That Pascal and Descartes were of kindred spirit as mathematical geniuses should also 
not be ignored. 
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Those who seek to prove the existence of God by an a priori argument of the 
non-Christian sort, prove too much. If they prove the necessary existence of God, 
they also prove the necessary existence of everything else that exists. The neces­
sary existence of God is said to be implied in the final existence of man. That is 
taken to mean, in effect, that necessary existence is a correlative to relative 
existence. But this in turn implies that relative existence is a correlative to neces­
sary existence. Thus God comes into existence by the hypostatization of man. 
Temporal things together with the evil in them are then taken as correlative to 
God. This is destructive of God's unchangeability. God, as well as man is in this 
way made subject to change. Thus we are back at chance as the most funda­
mental concept in philosophy. A priori reasoning on non-Christian assumptions, 
no less than a posteriori reasoning upon non-Christian assumptions, leads to the 
apotheosis of chance and thus to the destruction of predication.50 
When Van Til speaks of a priorism of the "non-Christian sort" this implies 
his acceptance of an alternative sort of a priorism. This is the Christian sort. 
He is speaking of course about divine revelation in the scriptures. It is here 
where God reveals himself as the self-contained ontological Trinity. It is 
here where God speaks in Son and Spirit. It is here where Jesus Christ gives 
divine self-attestation. 
With the presupposition of God's existence you have more than probability, you 
have absolute necessity. The indispensable character of the presupposition of 
God's existence is the best possible proof of God's actual existence. If God does 
not exist, we know nothing. For Descartes' formula, "I think, therefore I am," we 
now substitute, "God thinks, therefore I am." The actuality of God's existence 
is the presupposition of the intelligibility of the concepts of possibility and proba­
bility."51 
And to this we can add that the probabilistic nature of Pascal's wager is 
replaced with the certain and necessary character of Jesus Christ's invitation. 
In the exercise under consideration here, the non-Christian epistemo-
logical methodology is driven to implosion because the causality of God's 
created order has been reversed. The position of authority must replace 
that of reason. All facts, all laws—even Blaise Pascal's laws of probability 
—are brought into existence by the creative force of the self-existent and 
non-contingent God. This God is not reasoned into existence by the crea­
tion of Pascal's laws of probability. To speak of these laws in an attempt to 
prove the existence of this self-contained eternal Being is to engage in 
irrationalism of the highest order. Thus, the pragmatic rationalism of Pascal's 
Wager has been reduced to unintelligible irrationalism, because, whereas 
the notion of God as he appears in the Wager is one of only bare possibility 
50 Cornelius Van Til, Christian-Theistic Evidences> In Defense of Biblical Christianity Series, vol. 
6 (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978), 25-26. 
51 Ibid., 42. 
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to which is attached an objective probability, the self-existing God of Scrip­
ture is absolute actuality, the interpreter of all facts, whom to presuppose 
vitiates the relevance of hypothetical testing. The universe has God in back 
of it, not chance. 
We have established our major objection to Pascal's House of Wager and 
the philosophical foundations upon which it is constructed. We have also 
demonstrated that this House will sink in this shifting philosophical sand 
because not permanently undergirded by the self-contained trinitarian rock, 
son of that eternal and absolute Master Builder and Creator. 
It now remains to show how particular shortcomings of the Wager are 
addressed by the presuppositional system of Christian theism. 
A helpful summary of the 4'limitations of the Wager Argument" is pre­
sented by Rescher who enumerates six types of individuals who will not be 
moved by such an appeal, as Pascal himself puts it, "to natural lights." 
This list includes: the atheist ("who sets the probability of God's existence 
at zero"); the "all-out hedonist" (one living for the moment alone having 
no interest in future benefits the probability of which, recall, constitutes the 
crux of the argument); the "all-trusting disbeliever" (who believes that if 
God did exist he would be an all-forgiving, benevolent force); the radical 
skeptic (who "denies not only knowledge but reasonable conviction as well"); 
the individual who disavows a life based on those "decision-theoretic prin­
ciples" underlying expected-value calculations; and the member of a rival 
religion. This raises a legitimate question: To whom, then, is the Wager 
directed? 
L'homme moyen sensuel, the ordinary, self-centered "man of the world" preoccupied 
with his own well-being and his own prudential interests. Pascal does not address 
the already converted, but the glib worldly cynic—the freethinking libertin of his 
day, the sort of persons who populated the social circle in which Pascal himself 
moved prior to his conversion. The format of the discussion is that of a dialogue 
with just such a person. . . . 
The aim of Pascal's Wager argument is one of apologetics and not of theological 
theorizing. And, even here, it is a special-purpose instrument with a limited and 
special mission—to stiffen the backbone of the slack and worldly Christian.52 
Rescher concludes by asserting that "all other battles of apologetics" required 
for the conversion of those enumerated in the list above must be 4 'fought on 
other fronts with other weapons."53 
If such a significant group of individuals finds itself clearly outside the net 
cast by Pascal's apologetic enterprise, then what possible purpose can it 
serve? It is hard to imagine such a venerated, ages-old, well-known and 
oft-repeated apologetic enterprise as being so attenuated in its apologetic 
applicability to the world at large. But Rescher may well be right. Perhaps 
52 Rescher, Pascal's Wager, 26-27. 
53 Ibid., 24-25, 27. 
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for three and a half centuries the Wager has been over-rated or misunder­
stood as an effective tool for bringing individuals into the kingdom on the 
basis of probabilities and appeals to sheer, prudential self-interest. 
The classification of people untouched by the Wagers deserves further 
examination because to address the underlying characteristics of these groups 
is to develop a comprehensive and therefore successful apologetic approach. 
An apologetic enterprise needs to be developed that can apprise this first 
class the atheist and the "all-out hedonist" (for their presuppositions are 
the same)—of the absurdity of their position. This absurdity is rooted in the 
fact that the creature's fallible, self-referential position constitutes the presup­
position of that very atheism to which he or she subscribes, not some appeal 
to epistemological neutrality. To understand there to be a metaphysical 
choice as to whether or not God exists, and this on the basis of fallible 
interpretation of perceived brute fact (whether this fact be rationally demon­
strable (Descartes) or rationally pragmatic (Pascal), or conceived any other 
way, for that matter) is not only an intellectual faux pas but itself constitutes 
irrational unbelief of the highest order. How one conducts one's life here 
does make a difference, for it indicates one's metaphysical and epistemo-
logical commitment. The hedonist and the atheist are together suppressers 
of the truth, a truth of which they are aware because of their metaphysical 
likeness to the Creator in an image-bearing capacity. Somehow the naivete 
of the "all-trusting disbeliever" must be exposed for what it is—unbelief 
and covenant-breaking rebellion. To expect to meet up with such a bene­
volent God (if as this individual thinks contra factum he exists) is a mistake 
with eternal consequences. It is an arrogant and gravely mistaken presup­
position to presume on this God's neutrality on such conditions as, for 
example, belief/disbelief and obedience/disobedience. God's position is amply 
demonstrated in Scripture by his system of commandments, promises and 
rewards—the key features of Scripture's covenantal framework. 
The second class of individuals not subject to the Wager's apologetic 
thrust are radical skeptics and disbelievers in probability analysis. The 
reason we group together such polar opposites is that they have one thing 
in common already—lack of confidence in the nature and abilities of the 
creature. As opposed to the stubbornness and immovability of the atheist, 
members of this group generally do not need to be disabused of an irra­
tional and unsubstantiated faith in their own metaphysical condition and 
epistemic capabilities. It remains to lead such individuals to the character 
and truth claims of the self-contained ontological Trinity. They already 
doubt. These individuals have already disavowed the premises of the Pascalian 
gamble.54 It remains to convince them of the premises of the biblical surety. 
Metaphysical, and epistemological skepticism can be met with the biblical 
Rescher states about the Wager: ' 'like any other argument, it proceeds from premises and 
is accordingly impotent to enjoin its conclusion on someone who does not accept them" (Ibid., 24). 
PASCAL'S WAGER 61 
view of the universe and knowledge. It is not surprising that Pascal's Wager 
is considered non-effectual in bringing around the skeptic. Could it be other­
wise, with an apologetic tool itself rooted in skepticism? A successful defense 
of the faith must be rooted in the firm foundations of self-authenticating 
scriptures; only upon this can a sturdy apologetic fort be built which will 
withstand the onslaught of unbelief, weather the storms of doubt and, 
within its walls, nurture the first tentative steps to belief. 
The final group of people for whom, according to Rescher, the Wager fails 
because not directed at them is adherents of "rival theologies," religions 
with different truth claims, systems of belief with different ideas about 
rewards and alternative value structures from those upon which the Wager 
is based. So the search is on for an approach that will bring such individuals 
to the Christ of scriptures. 
Gathering together the characteristics of these unreachable people, then, 
we can reemphasize that the target group of the Wager is those who: are 
prepared to allow for the non-zero probability of God's existence; are con­
vinced of future benefits and the possibility of advantage of belief; are 
prepared to yield to practical, interest-oriented reason seeing the failure of 
theoretical, cognitive reason; are adherents of decision-making theory and 
prepared to base self-interest in the balance of probabilities; and, finally, 
have a sense of the God of Christianity and not of rival religions. 
This list of potential candidates is a narrow one indeed, and, if accurate, 
emphasizes the attenuated apologetic thrust of the Wager. In the statistical 
context of the model above we have made an attempt to push out the bound­
aries of Pascal's Wager. Such extension, it is believed, could broaden signi­
ficantly the scope of apologetic possibilities in the manner indicated, that 
method based upon the subsumption of degrees of belief or unbelief, con­
strained by the overall construct of the Wager model and its assigned proba­
bilities. But it is important now to recognize just how seriously abbreviated 
is Pascal's Wager according to Reseller's not unreasonable stipulations above. 
A presuppositional approach to apologetics which takes as given the 
self-attesting witness of Jesus Christ—who alone is the way, the truth and 
the life—is that other weapon Rescher is seeking; the front on which the 
apologetic battle is fought can only be on the front of divine self-revelation. 
There is hope for the atheist, the hedonist and the all-trusting disbeliever, 
despite complete epistemological and spiritual antithesis. There is hope for 
the skeptic and the non-prudential individual in the certitude of Scripture, 
in divine interpretation of fact and in the prudence of God's desire for his 
own. There is hope for the Muslim, the Jew, the Buddhist/Hindu in the 
reality of the self-attesting Savior-son Jesus Christ of Scripture, who is one 
with the Father and the Holy Spirit, a self-sufficient triune God. For in 
distinction from the foreign gods who confuse the one and the many, the 
believer can speak of the "equal ultimacy of the one and the many or of 
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unity and diversity in the Godhead."55 This hope rests on the fact that all 
creatures are made in the image of an autonomous, non-contingent, 
ontologically-necessary Creator God, and continue to bear traces of this 
image if significantly altered by sin. On the strength of this metaphysical 
common ground, these groups of people can be convinced of the truth 
(written on their hearts) and welcomed into the Kingdom, even if the Wager 
won't do this. 
We close this section with a brief conclusion regarding the logical and 
probabilistic heart of the Wager when seen through the prism of Scripture. 
The assertions of the Wager are given coherence by the logical structure of 
decision-theoretic principles and probability analysis. Logic is the means 
whereby the fact of these principles are given order and coherence. But this 
creature-referent interpretation of these facts—and thus the principles— 
dooms them from the start. Insofar as coherence and meaning arise from 
this epistemic exercise in logic, it is derived from the divinely-interpreted 
facts. God has given these facts meaning in a creatively constructive fashion 
and the Wager uses these facts in a receptively reconstructive way. The 
coherence of the Wager, such as it exists, is obtained with the "borrowed 
capital of Christian-theism. In point of fact, all creaturely predication is 
so indebted. Cornelius Van Til puts it this way: 
In all three of these fields of endeavor [science, philosophy and theology] man 
seeks to show that his assertions are both according to logic and according to fact. 
But when he thinks that his assertions are fully in accord with the law of contra­
diction and therefore fully clear, they are purely tautological. In that case, science 
has no contingency, philosophy no synthesis, theology no revelation. His logic 
hovers above the field of fact, like a turnpike in the sky with no approaches to it. 
He can go as fast as he wills on this turnpike in either direction; it makes no 
difference in which direction he goes for going is the same as standing still.56 
Any intelligibility derived from the Wager is with the borrowed capital of 
Christian epistemology whose metaphysic reflects the biblical view of the 
relation of humanity to the world and presupposes God from the outset. But 
the probabilistic God issuing forth from this lottery demonstrates conclu­
sively that ultimately, if Pascal's betting partner chooses to respond to 
Pascal s invitation to gamble, the bet will be placed in favor of a God whose 
existence, even at twenty-five per cent probability, is but one floating on a 
sea of chance; how can such a God offer infinite benefits to Pascal's self-
interested gambling partner? 
IV. Concluding Observations 
It has been demonstrated that Pascal's Wager, on its own terms, sustains 
the attacks that have been made upon it and that its use of reason is eminently 
Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed. (Phillipsburg, NT: Presbyterian and 
Reformed, 1967), 181. 
Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed, 1969), 320. 
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reasonable. Reformulations of the Wager; however conducted, are bound to 
fail because the attempted overhauls are constructed upon presuppositions 
untrue to Pascal's own thought, whether due to misinterpretation (Jules 
Lachelier and many others) or by design (Robert M. Adams-Soren Kierke­
gaard). We must remain true to Pascal's own understanding of the reward 
structure he created and as represented in Figure 1 above. But we have 
demonstrated that some concerns raised by attempts at reconstruction can 
be incorporated in a conceptual and statistically sound way. This extension 
of the Wager we tentatively introduced to initiate further development in a 
direction which will prove fruitful for those wishing to pursue the study of 
the  Wager  on i ts  own terms (Figure  2 ) .  
Taken as Pascal developed it, the Wager easily weathers the opprobrium 
it has incurred on account of its use of reason to close the bet for belief in 
the existence of God on the basis of sheer self-interest. But as an apologetic 
tool it fails for this very reason, yielding a God whose existence is, at best, 
only probable, and thus a God afloat on a sea of chance. The metaphysical and 
epistemological presuppositions of creaturely autonomy, creature-referent 
interpretation of brute fact and the ensuing disjunction between this and 
logic reduce its apparent rationalism to pure irrationalism and ensure failure 
of the Wager in Pascal's apologetic endeavor. 
But this should not color our understanding of Blaise Pascal's system of 
beliefs and ethics as much as we can systematize its fragmentary nature. For 
Pascal was a convert to a particular orthodox faction within the Church of 
Rome, a faction whose distinction lay in its commitment to moral purity 
and biblical orthodoxy, even if not within the framework of a completely 
refined and finished system. With the use of these emphases, we demon­
strated Pascal's like-mindedness with the Puritans of his century who, in 
addition to esteeming reason highly, had grave concern for the Jesuit domi­
nance in the area of moral theology, and therefore sought to establish a 
value system which, upon examination, closely approximates the presupposi-
tional system of ethics. The ethical principles espoused by Pascal, drawn 
from his Pensees, and articulated not only in opposition to the Jesuits' system 
but also as it developed from his own theological reflections, was shown to 
be of kindred spirit with the presuppositional system developed by Corne­
lius Van Til, if not altogether precise in the (Reformed) details. This demon­
strates that efforts to glean a system of ethics from the Wager; as such, are 
misdirected and underscore the necessity of taking Blaise Pascal in a holistic 
fashion, resisting the all too common temptation to dismiss him out of hand 
as simply a prudentially-oriented rationalist, seeking pragmatic justifica­
tion for religious belief. For Blaise Pascal, was a spiritual kin of the Puritans, 
a Christian and a brilliant philosopher and mathematician. If we recognize 
the Wager as an apologetic construct with little usefulness in and of itself, 
but as an imperfect part of his larger endeavor to set out a system of faith 
and morals, something very important to Blaise Pascal as we have demon­
strated, why then should the Wager cause us to despair of him? 
